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1 Introduction
The choice of exchange rate regime and its impact on economic performance is among the most con-
troversial issues in macroeconomic policy. The empirical works on the growth eﬀect of exchange rate
volatility conclude either on exchange rate neutrality, or on a diﬀerent eﬀect in industrial and developing
countries.1 Some recent studies suggest that the failure of the empirical literature at bringing a stable,
clear-cut eﬀect of exchange volatility to the fore may be due to nonlinear eﬀects: Razin and Rubinstein
(2006) allow the exchange rate regime to have both a direct eﬀect on short-term growth, and an indirect
one that is channeled through the crisis probability, while Aghion et al. (2009) argue that the choice of
exchange rate regime should depend on ﬁnancial development. Using a sample of 83 countries spanning
the years 1960-2000, they show that real exchange rate volatility can have a signiﬁcant impact on the
long-term rate of productivity growth, but the eﬀect depends critically on the countries' level of ﬁnancial
development.
This paper argues that, besides ﬁnancial development, another prominent feature of emerging markets
can explain the contrasting eﬀects of exchange rate ﬂexibility on growth in developing and industrial
countries, namely liability dollarization, also referred to as original sin , that is the inability of developing
countries to borrow in their own currency. The focus on dollarization is justiﬁed by the idea that, on
the one hand, the volatility of cash ﬂows matters for long-run growth, as empirical works tend to show
(Aghion et al., 2005, 2007); on the other, liability dollarization impairs ﬁrms' capacities to hedge currency
risk. This idea is tackled both theoretically and empirically.
On the theoretical side, I borrow from Aghion et al. (2009) to build a stylized model in which volatility
matters for long-run growth: when ﬁrms face credit constraints, negative shocks to their cash ﬂows
deteriorate their innovating capacities, whereas a positive shock will not have any impact if the ﬁrm
is already at its optimum. This asymmetric eﬀect of shocks under ﬁnancial frictions rationalizes the
negative impact of cash-ﬂow volatility on innovation and growth: the consequences of negative cash ﬂow
shocks are not oﬀset by the eﬀects of positive shocks. Besides, wages are sticky, which makes exchange
rate policy matter for cash ﬂow volatility. I supplement this framework with two important features to
account for the role of ﬁnancial dollarization under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes: 1) the production is
split into tradable and nontradable goods while ﬁrms face costs in tradable goods when innovating; 2) the
ﬁrms' debt can be partially or completely denominated in terms of tradable goods. The question then is:
depending on the level of dollarization, what regime stabilizes better the cash ﬂows -that is, proﬁts net
of debt repayments- in terms of tradable goods, thus allowing a better average ﬁnancing capacity?
The relative stabilizing properties of exchange rate regimes is a recurring question in the theoretical
literature. In particular, whether liability dollarization reverses the superiority of the ﬂexible regime has
1Baxter and Stockman (1989) were the ﬁrst to bring this "instability puzzle" forward. The literature has since been
inconclusive on the subject: Husain et al. (2005) ﬁnd that exchange rate ﬂexibility is growth-enhancing in industrial countries
and neutral in developing economies, while Dubas et al. (2005), relying on an alternative exchange-rate classiﬁcation, ﬁnd
that a ﬁxed exchange rate has good growth performances in the latter while it is neutral in the former. Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2003) ﬁnd that, on average, countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime grow at a slower rate.
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been a particularly compelling issue.2 Cespedes et al. (2002) and Devereux et al. (2006) argue that, when
using a full-ﬂedged DSGE model, the conventional ranking is unchanged. However, Cook and Cook (2002)
and Cook (2004) ﬁnd, with diﬀerent speciﬁcations, that the picture is more nuanced. Here, I develop
a stylized model with one feature which is essential in evaluating the diﬀerent performance of regimes,
namely the frictions in adjusting consumption between tradable and nontradable goods, which makes the
nontradable sector particularly vulnerable. These frictions have been emphasized by Christiano et al.
(2004) and Mendoza (2001), but in other contexts than the choice of exchange rate regimes (namely,
currency crises and sudden stops). Indeed, with low elasticity of substitution between tradable and
nontradable goods, the output measured in foreign currency is more volatile under ﬂexible regimes. As a
result, ﬂoating exchange rates are detrimental for growth as compared to ﬁxed exchange rates, especially
in highly dollarized countries. In low-dollarization countries, this ranking can be reversed thanks to the
hedging properties of domestically-denominated debt.
To test the basic hypothesis that exchange rate ﬂexibility has a more negative impact in dollarized
countries, standard growth regressions are used. Those standard growth regressions are augmented by
a measure of exchange rate ﬂexibility, a measure of external dollarization and the interaction term of
exchange rate ﬂexibility and dollarization. The results are based on a dynamic panel of 76 emerging and
industrial countries between 1995 and 2004 described above. To measure exchange rate ﬂexibility, I use the
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes. The dollarization measure
is the external original sin taken from Hausmann et al. (2001) and Hausmann and Panizza (2003). The
empirical results show that exchange rate ﬂexibility is more detrimental to growth in dollarized countries
than in non-dollarized countries, which is in line with the model's predictions. These ﬁndings are robust
to various speciﬁcations and to the treatment of endogeneity.
Among the empirical works on liability dollarization at the macro level, only a few have examined
the overall growth impact of original sin.3 Bleaney and Vargas (2009) is closer to our approach. They
investigate the role of the debt composition to explain the negative eﬀect of depreciation on growth
in emerging markets. Our approach diﬀers in that it focuses on the interaction of debt composition
with exchange rate volatility -and more generally, exchange rate management, and not exchange rate
depreciations.
Section 2 presents a stylized model of growth and monetary policy. Section 3 derives the empirical
implications of the model regarding the link between growth and exchange rate volatility. Section 4 tests
these empirical predictions.
2Early contributions include, among others, Calvo (2000); Krugman (2000); Aghion et al. (2000).
3See for example on liability dollarization Arteta (2005); Calvo et al. (2004); De Nicolo et al. (2003); Reinhart et al.
(2003); Levy-Yeyati (2006); Eichengreen et al. (2005); Bleaney and Vargas (2009) and in particular, on its impact on growth
Reinhart et al. (2003); Levy-Yeyati (2006); Bleaney and Vargas (2009)
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2 A stylized monetary model with growth
In this section, we present a stylized model to illustrate the impact of exchange rate management on
growth in the presence of liability dollarization. The model combines three important features: (i)
growth proceeds from innovation undertaken by ﬁrms with suﬃcient funds to meet liquidity shocks; (ii)
wages are sticky, implying that the transmission of macroeconomic shocks is shaped by the choice of
exchange rate regime; (iii) ﬁrms' debt can be partially or completely denominated in dollars.
First, we describe how, in the presence of credit constraints, growth depends on ﬁrms' proﬁts and
thus on the interplay between liability dollarization and the real exchange rate, but only in a partial
equilibrium approach. Second, the model is closed by introducing monetary policy and households.
2.1 Firms and the growth process
Consider a small open economy with a continuum of ﬁrms, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Firms produce both
tradable goods T , which are identical to the outside world good, and nontradable ones N . There are two
currencies: the domestic currency (peso) and the foreign one (dollar).
Firms are price-taker and competitive so that the law of one price applies in the sector of tradables:
PTt = StP
T∗
t
where PTt and P
T∗
t are respectively the domestic (peso) and foreign (dollar) price of tradable goods and
St is the nominal exchange rate. P
T∗
t is assumed to be constant and normalized to one. Thus P
T
t = St.
The timing within period t can be summarized as follows. First, wages are preset. The entrepreneurs
borrow Dt to be able to innovate in period t + 1: that is upgrade At, the level of productivity. An
aggregate productivity shock occurs in the tradable sector, ﬁrms hire labor Lt and produce AtY
T
t and
AtY
N
t , respectively the production of tradable and nontradable goods. Firms repay their debt Dt, and
pay the wages AtWtLt, with AtWt the wage rate and Lt labor. Firm i, i ∈ [0, 1] faces a liquidity shock
AtΦ
i
t in dollars. If the liquidity shock is ﬁnanced, then the ﬁrm is able to innovate and recovers AtΦ
i
t. If
it is not ﬁnanced, then the ﬁrm cannot innovate and disappears at the end of the period. Finally, ﬁrms
distribute proﬁts.
First, the process governing the evolution of productivity is presented to determine how growth
depends on current cash ﬂows. We then determine cash ﬂows.
2.1.1 The evolution of productivity
Innovation process The innovation process is speciﬁed as follows: if the ﬁrm is able to overcome the
liquidity shock of period t, then its t+ 1 productivity is upgraded by a factor δ > 1. Otherwise, the ﬁrm
keeps the same productivity level. As a result, aggregate productivity evolves according to:
At+1 = δρtAt + (1− ρt)At
with ρt the proportion of innovating ﬁrms. The aggregate growth rate is therefore g = (δ − 1)ρt.
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Credit market imperfections and liquidity shocks To be able to innovate, the ﬁrm has to pay
a ﬁxed cost Dt = dAt (d > 0) in dollars at the beginning of period t. Firms start the period without
funds, so they must borrow Dt. For tractability, ﬁrms' indebtedness is introduced under the form of a
ﬁxed cost. It is also assumed that the cost of borrowing is lower than the expected value of innovation,
which implies that ﬁrms always choose to pay the ﬁxed cost. This cost can be viewed as spending on
R&D, learning expenses or investment in a new technology.
At the end of period t, a liquidity shock AtΦ
i
t, where Φ
i
t is independently and identically distributed
across ﬁrms, threatens the completion of the innovation process of ﬁrm i. If the ﬁrm does not ﬁnance
this cost, it cannot innovate. If it meets this cost, it recovers AtΦ
i
t at the end of the current period.
For simplicity, it is also assumed that the liquidity cost can be ﬁnanced with a zero interest rate. As a
consequence, the innovation cost is neutral regarding the net proﬁt of the current period. Therefore, it is
always proﬁtable for the ﬁrms to ﬁnance the liquidity shock. AtΦ
i
t can be viewed as the cost induced by
a delay, typically in an imported equipment, or any transitory shock that would ruin the business unless
there is enough liquidity to overcome it.
The access to ﬁnancial markets is therefore critical to determine the innovation capacity of the ﬁrm
at this point, as Aghion et al. (2009) show. However, here, in order to stress the speciﬁc role of liability
dollarization, we assume that the ﬁrm has no access at all to credit markets at this stage, so ﬁrms are
able to overcome the transitory liquidity shock if and only if their cash ﬂow is suﬃcient to meet the cost:
Πt ≥ Φit
where Πt is the cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm expressed in dollars and scaled by At.
Firms have the same cash ﬂows Πt and diﬀer only regarding the liquidity shock Φ
i
t. Therefore, ρt, the
proportion of ﬁrms which are not constrained (and thus of innovating ﬁrms), is the proportion of ﬁrms
whose liquidity shock is lower than Πt:
ρt = P (Φ
i
t < Πt) = F (Πt) (1)
where F is the cumulative distribution of Φit.
The aggregate growth rate depends directly on the level of cash ﬂows Πt.
Volatility and growth Here, I give an example of how volatility aﬀects average growth, that is
E(ρt). Assume that the idiosyncratic liquidity shock φ
i
t is uniformly distributed over (φ, φ), and that the
disturbance on proﬁts Πt resulting from the aggregate shock and exchange rate policy is of the following
form:
Πt =
 E(Π) + σpi with probability 12E(Π)− σpi with probability 12 (2)
with σpi strictly positive. σpi is a measure of aggregate volatility around the steady-state proﬁts E(Π).
I assume that E(Π)−σpi > φ, which means that in the worst state of nature, there is always a positive
fraction of ﬁrms that are able to overcome the liquidity shock. Under this reasonable assumption, the
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probability to innovate given the aggregate shock is then:
ρt = min
{
Πt − φ
φ− φ , 1
}
Taking expectations gives:
E(ρt) =

E(Π)−φ
φ−φ if E(Π) + σ
pi < φ¯
E(Π)−φ
φ−φ −
E(Π)+σpi−φ
2(φ−φ) otherwise
The average proportion of innovating ﬁrms -and therefore the average growth rate- is clearly decreasing
in the size of the aggregate shock σpi. The intuition is that when shocks are small, some ﬁrms are
constrained for both good and bad aggregate shocks. More volatility would allow more ﬁrms to innovate
in the good state while preventing more ﬁrms from doing so in the bad one, leaving the average proportion
of innovating ﬁrms unchanged. For large shocks, all ﬁrms innovate in the good state. In that case, more
volatility would crowd out more ﬁrms in the bad state while not allowing more ﬁrms to innovate in the
good state. The idea is simply that when volatility increases, the gains generated in the good states are
exhausted sooner or later, which does not allow to make for the additional losses in bad states.
2.1.2 Firms' cash-ﬂows
Production and growth Firms have identical technologies. A ﬁrm produces both tradable and non-
tradable goods. The tradable and nontradable productions of ﬁrm i ∈ [0, 1] during period t are respec-
tively denoted by AtY
Ti
t and AtY
Ni
t and:
Y Tit = Y
T
t = e
ut (3)
Y Nit = Y
N
t =
√
Lt (4)
where Lt denotes labor. Y
Ti
t and Y
Ni
t are the ﬁrm's productions scaled by the level of productivity and
ut is the aggregate productivity shock in the tradable sector, with ut = σ, σ > 0 with probability 1/2
and ut = −σ with probability 1/2. The labor demand is identical across ﬁrms because ﬁrms have the
same technology. For simplicity, it is assumed that the production of nontradables requires labor while
the production of tradables involves no input. This speciﬁcation has been chosen to capture the fact that
the nontradable sector is more labor-intensive than the tradable sector.
Firms choose employment to maximize the nontradable proﬁt PNt
√
Lt −WtLt with respect to Lt,
where Wt is the wage scaled by At, and P
N
t is the peso price of nontradable goods. We get the implicit
labor demand function:
WtLt =
PNt Y
N
t
2
(5)
Indebtment and dollarization It is assumed that debt Dt = dAt is contracted in nominal terms and
is denominated either in foreign currency (dollars) or in local currency (pesos). An exogenous fraction α
is denominated in dollars while the rest is denominated in pesos. α is the degree of dollarization.
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We assume that the level of dollarization is exogenous. Indeed, the fact that liability dollarization
is imposed on developing countries is commonly admitted in the literature.45. This ﬁnancial markets
incompleteness is often related to the lack of sound institutions and can therefore be regarded as exoge-
nous.6
r∗, the interest rate on dollar bonds, is ﬁxed internationally. It is assumed that foreigners are risk
neutral and value dollars so that r, the interest rate on peso bonds, satisﬁes the following no-arbitrage
condition:
E
(
1 + r
PTt
)
= 1 + r∗
At the end of period t, the ﬁrm has therefore to repay in dollars:(
α+
1
PTt Et−1
1
PTt
(1− α)
)
(1 + r∗)Dt
Cash ﬂows The liquidity shock occurs after the ﬁrm has paid the wage bill and repaid the debt, so the
cash ﬂow in terms of dollars and scaled by At is Πt = Y
T
t +
PNt
PTt
Y Nt −WtLtPTt −
α+ 1
PTt E
(
1
PTt
) (1− α)
 (1+
r∗)d. After replacing the wage bill using labor demand (5), one gets:
Πt = Y
T
t +
1
2
PNt
PTt
Y Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gross proﬁts
−
α+ 1
PTt Et−1
(
1
PTt
) (1− α)
 (1 + r∗)d
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt repayments
(6)
The cash ﬂows include gross proﬁts, but to get the actual cash on hand, debt repayments must be
subtracted from them. Comparing the gross proﬁt component and the debt component of cash ﬂows
gives the actual ﬁnancing capacity of ﬁrms.
Because ﬁrms' revenues are partly in nontradable goods while the liquidity shock is denominated in
tradables, ﬁrms face a currency mismatch. According to (6), ﬁrms' gross proﬁts are sensitive to nominal
exchange rate variations (changes in PTt ). However, the peso-denominated fraction of ﬁrms' debt helps
them hedge the variations in the nontradable value of their proﬁts. For example, everything else equal,
a nominal depreciation implies a fall in the value of gross proﬁts in terms of tradables. If α = 1, debt
4See for example Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).
5Yet, some authors ﬁnd that exchange rate regimes do aﬀect ﬁrms' balance sheets. In particular, the adoption of a
ﬂoating exchange rate regime leads to a higher degree of currency matching (and the opposite for the adoption of ﬁxed
regimes), as Galiani et al. (2003) show for the case of Argentina's currency board and Kamil (2008) does for a panel of
emerging countries. However, these studies are conducted on developing countries only. On our macro data set, for a
given exchange rate regime, developing countries still exhibit higher liability dollarization than industrial ones, which is a
symptom of imposed original sin.
6Existing explanations point at time inconsistency problems related to the temptation to "default" on local currency
debt through inﬂation (Calvo and Guidotti, 1989), the incidence of implicit debtor guarantees (Burnside et al., 2001) and
signaling problems (De la Torre et al., 2003), among others. De Nicolo et al. (2003) provides evidence that the credibility of
macroeconomic policy and the quality of institutions are both key determinants of cross-country variations in dollarization.
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repayments, in terms of tradables, are immune to exchange rate variations, whereas if α < 1, a nominal
depreciation leads to a decrease in debt repayments in terms of tradables, which alleviates the overall
impact of the depreciation on the total cash ﬂows.
However, whether this intuition is robust to general equilibrium is not guaranteed. The following
subsection closes the model in order to derive its properties in general equilibrium.
2.2 Introducing exchange rate policy
The purpose of this subsection is to examine the impact of exchange rate policy, which is implemented
through a monetary instrument, in terms of transmission of shocks to prices and quantities, and therefore
to ﬁrms' cash ﬂows.
The presence of nominal rigidities (preset wages) implies that monetary policy has real consequences,
in particular in terms of cash ﬂows volatility. Some other key assumptions contribute to shape the
model's predictions. First, the nontradable sector is more labor-intensive than the tradable one. This
is empirically relevant, but it has also an important implication, which is that an output contraction
is consistent with a real depreciation. As a result, the peso-denominated debt has hedging properties
regarding cash-ﬂows volatility in terms of dollars. Second, the elasticity of substitution between tradables
and nontradables is lower than one, which is widely admitted in the literature, but is also key in ranking
the ﬂexible and ﬁxed exchange rate regimes in terms of cash-ﬂow volatility.
The model is closed in a simplistic way in order to keep the model as tractable as possible. The
following assumptions are made, without loss of generality: (i) the demand addressed to ﬁrms is given by
consumers without access to ﬁnancial markets (hand-to-mouth consumers); (ii) the government controls
directly the general price level. Finally, (iii) we assume, as in Aghion et al. (2009), that the real wage at
the beginning of period t is assumed equal to some reservation value, kAtt:
Wt
E(Pt)
= kAt (7)
2.2.1 Households
The households do not have access to ﬁnancial markets, so their program consists simply in allocating
their resources between their consumption of tradable and nontradable goods. They maximize their
consumption basket Ct -scaled by the level of productivity At:
Ct =
[
γ
1
θC
T θ−1θ
t + (1− γ)
1
θC
N θ−1θ
t
] θ
θ−1
(8)
subject to their -scaled- budget constraint:
PTt C
T
t + P
N
t C
N
t = Πt +W
j
t L
j
t (9)
where CTt and C
N
t are respectively the consumptions of tradables and nontradables, scaled by At. The
households use the dividends (ﬁrms' net proﬁts) and their wage to ﬁnance their consumption in tradables
and nontradables. θ is the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods. It is
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assumed that θ < 1, which means that goods are weakly substitutable. This is a standard assumption
regarding tradables and nontradables. 0 < γ < 1 is the weight of tradables in the consumption basket.
The program yields the relative demand for tradables and nontradables:
PNt
PTt
=
(
1− γ
γ
CTt
CNt
) 1
θ
(10)
The general price index associated to the household maximization program is the following:
Pt =
(
γPT1−θt + (1− γ)PN1−θt
) 1
1−θ (11)
2.2.2 Monetary policy
The monetary policy targets either the stability of the general price index - ﬂexible exchange rate:
Pt = P¯ (12)
or the stability of the nominal exchange rate - ﬁxed exchange rate:
PTt = P¯
T (13)
where P¯ and P¯T are constant.
2.2.3 Equilibrium
Since nontradables cannot be traded internationally, the nontradable output is entirely consumed:
Y Nt = C
N
t (14)
Besides, the tradable consumption is what remains from the tradable production after repaying the debt:
Y Tt −
α+ (1− α) 1
PTt E
(
1
PTt
)
 (1 + r∗)d = CTt (15)
This means that both current accounts, in tradables and nontradables, are balanced.7
Deﬁnition: For each period t, given At−1 and At, a symmetric equilibrium is deﬁned by a set of
prices
{
PNt , P
T
t , Pt,Wt
}
and allocations
{
Y Nt , Y
T
t , C
N
t , C
T
t , Lt
}
that solves the supply of nontradable
and tradable goods (3) and (4), the aggregate labor demand (5), the wage-setting equation (7), the rel-
ative demand for tradable and nontradable goods (10), the price index (11), one of the two monetary
7The current account in the tradable sector is balanced because we have assumed that there is no intertemporal trading,
that is no asset trade. This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis but is not crucial. Qualitatively, the results would be
unchanged if we introduced intertemporal trade in bonds. This is because, as long as there is imperfect risk sharing, a
productivity shock leads households to alter their consumption, which is at the origin of the mechanisms of the model.
Trade in bonds only limits the impact of productivity shocks on consumption by sharing their eﬀect between current and
future consumption; it does not suppress it. The diﬀerence with the model without trade in bonds is only quantitative and
does not alter the comparison between regimes.
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policies (12) or (13) and the equilibrium conditions on the tradable and nontradable markets (14) and (15).
If the equilibrium productions and prices are determined, the values of ﬁrms' cash ﬂows Πt can be
inferred from (6).8
The empirical predictions of the model are derived in the next section by log-linearizing the model
around the non-stochastic steady state and by studying the transmission mechanisms under both regimes.
3 Model's empirical implications
In this section, I study the diﬀerential impact of aggregate shocks on the quantities and prices under both
regimes by using the log-linearized version of the model (given in Appendix A) and then derive some
conclusions on exchange rate regimes and growth.
In what follws, xt denotes the deviation from the non-stochastic steady state of Xt: xt =
Xt−X
X w
ln(Xt)− ln(X). Time subscript are dropped for simplicity.
3.1 Reactions of quantities and prices to shocks
After log-linearizing the model (see Appendix A for details), the following proposition can be derived:
Proposition 1 (proof in Appendix A):
After an identical negative (positive) productivity shock in the tradable sector:
• If α = 1, the production of nontradables (yN ) falls (rises) more under a peg than under a ﬂoat.
However, the relative price of nontradables (pN−pT ) (henceforth the real exchange rate) experiences
a higher depreciation (appreciation) under a ﬂoat.
• Under a ﬂoat, the fall (rise) in the production of nontradables and in the real exchange rate is
dampened when α diminishes.
The intuition is the following: a negative shock on the productivity of the tradable sector requires
a real depreciation (a fall in pN − pT ) which results in a contractionary deﬂation in the nontradable
sector under both regimes, as illustrated in Figure 1. Indeed, in both regimes, a deﬂation in pN generates
a contraction in yN because the nontradable sector uses labor and the wages are predetermined. This
negative eﬀect on yN is accentuated under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime because the real depreciation
occurs entirely through a deﬂation in pN while under a ﬂexible regime it is shared between a rise in pT
and a fall in pN . However, precisely because of the further contraction in yN , the real exchange rate
depreciation is milder under a peg because it compensates for the fall in yT .
8To obtain the value of the aggregate variables in absolute terms, multiply
{
Y Nt , Y
T
t , C
N
t , C
T
t
}
by At (
{
Lt, PNt , P
T
t , Pt
}
are already in absolute terms).
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When α = 1, all the debt is denominated in dollar, so it plays no role in stabilizing the dollar value
of cash ﬂows, whatever the exchange rate regime. But when α falls, the consumption of tradables is
stabilized under a ﬂoat thanks to the hedging eﬀect of the peso-denominated debt, which mitigates the
required real depreciation and the consecutive adjustment in yN , as Figure 1 shows. The impact of a
positive shock yields symmetric results.
As a result, the comparative impact of a negative or positive shock on the nontradable production
valued in terms of tradables is ambiguous. But the following proposition can be established:
Proposition 2 (proof in Appendix A):
After an identical negative (positive) productivity shock in the tradable sector:
• If α = 1, the fall (rise) in the nontradable production valued in terms of tradables (yN + pN − pT )
is larger under a ﬂoat than under a peg.
• Under a ﬂoat, this fall (rise) is mitigated when α diminishes.
Take the case of a negative shock on the tradable production. Since tradable and nontradable goods
are weakly substitutable (θ < 1), prices move more than quantities. As a result, when α = 1, the
additional fall in the relative price of nontradables under a ﬂoat oﬀsets the additional fall in nontradable
output under a peg. The production of nontradables expressed in tradables therefore falls more under
a ﬂoat than under a peg. Noticeably, the traditional contractionary deﬂation is present under the ﬁxed
exchange rate regime. Despite that, the output in terms of tradables is more aﬀected if the exchange
rate freely ﬂoats. The existence of frictions in the reallocation between tradable and nontradable goods
inside the consumption basket is crucial to generate this result.
When α diminishes, the stabilizing eﬀect of the peso debt on the consumption of tradables makes the
response of nontradable production in terms of tradables smoother under a ﬂoat, because it stabilizes
both the production and the real exchange rate, according to Proposition 1. This is illustrated by the
behavior of yN + pN − pT in Figure 1. The symmetric eﬀects would hold if the shock is positive.
3.2 The impact of exchange rate regimes on growth
If we admit, following the arguments of section 2.1.1, that lower cash-ﬂow volatility yields higher growth
through a higher innovating probability, it is possible to infer what regime is preferred in terms of growth.
Proposition 3 (proof in Appendix A):
• If α = 1, a peg yields higher growth than a ﬂoat.
• When α decreases, the growth diﬀerential between a peg and a ﬂoat decreases.
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• If the indebtment level and the elasticity of substitution are high and if the share of nontradable
production is low, there exist values of α > 0 such that a ﬂoat yields higher growth than a peg.
The ﬁrst point of Proposition 3 is derived directly from Proposition 2. Under complete liability
dollarization, a ﬂexible exchange rate regime is characterized by accentuated variations of cash ﬂows
expressed in tradables, and therefore by lower average growth. The second point comes from the fact
that the peso-denominated debt has two stabilizing eﬀects on ﬁrms' cash ﬂows under a ﬂoat: 1) a direct
stabilizing eﬀect through the hedging role of debt repayments in pesos, 2) an indirect stabilizing eﬀect
through the stabilization of the nontradable output expressed in terms of tradables (Proposition 2). Thus,
under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime, the level of dollarization has a negative impact on growth because
it annihilate the hedging properties of the peso-denominated debt. Put diﬀerently, the hedging properties
of the peso-denominated debt can be exploited to stabilize cash ﬂows only within ﬂexible exchange rate
regimes.
The third point states that under certain conditions, when the level of liability dollarization diminishes,
the ﬂoating regime can even dominate the peg. These condition are those that maximize the hedging
properties of debt: a high indebtment level, a low share of nontradable production. Besides, a high
elasticity of substitution θ diminishes the relative advantage of the ﬁxed exchange rate regime in stabilizing
gross proﬁts.
Figure 2 shows the behavior of the variance of ﬁrms' cash ﬂows under ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange
rate regimes for some parameter values. The dashed lines are constructed under the assumption that
the steady-state ratio of debt repayments over the tradable consumption η is equal to 0.1 (low level of
debt) and the solid lines are drawn under the assumption that η = 0.7 (high level of debt).9 Besides, the
elasticity of substitution θ has been set at 0.6, which is a standard estimate of the elasticity of substitution
between tradable and nontradable goods (Lorenzo et al., 2005), and the weight of nontradable goods in
the consumption basket 1 − γ as well as in cash ﬂows κ are set to 0.6 (Mendoza, 2001).10 It appears
clearly that the volatility of cash ﬂows under a ﬂoat increases with the level of dollarization under both
parameters' conﬁguration. Under the ﬁrst hypothesis (low debt), the volatility of cash ﬂows with the
ﬂexible exchange rate regime is always higher than with the ﬁxed regime, whereas under the second
hypothesis (high debt), the volatility becomes lower with the ﬂexible exchange rate regime for small
values of α.
As a conclusion, the testable empirical implication of this model is that the ﬁxed exchange rate regime
is growth-enhancing as compared to the ﬂexible exchange rate regime in countries with high liability
dollarization and that the growth diﬀerential is decreasing as the level of dollarization falls. Whether
there are values of dollarization for which a ﬂoat becomes more growth-enhancing than a peg depends
on parameters values and has to be determined empirically.
9See Appendix A for the deﬁnition of η.
10See Appendix A for the deﬁnition of κ.
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4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, the prediction that the level of dollarization conditions the impact of exchange rate regimes
on growth is tested. The basic hypothesis is that exchange rate ﬂexibility has a more negative impact in
dollarized countries.
To do so, standard growth regressions are used. These regressions are augmented by a measure of
exchange rate ﬂexibility, a measure of external dollarization and the interaction term of exchange rate
ﬂexibility and dollarization. First, the data and methodology are presented and then the results based
on a dynamic panel of 76 countries between 1995 and 2004 are discussed.
4.1 Data and methodology
As is common in the growth empirical literature, we work on non-overlapping ﬁve-year averages. This
transformation aims at ﬁltering business-cycle ﬂuctuations and so allows us to focus on long-run eﬀects
only.
4.1.1 The dependent variable
The explained variable is the average growth rate of productivity on a ﬁve-year period. Productivity is
deﬁned as the ratio of real output per worker. Real GDP is in 1995 PPP-adjusted US dollars. The work
force and GDP data come respectively from the World Bank (World Development Indicators database)
and CEPII (CHELEM database).
4.1.2 Exchange rate ﬂexibility variable
The measure of exchange rate ﬂexibility is an index of exchange rate ﬂexibility based on the Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger (2002) (henceforth LS) classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes. They deﬁne exchange
rate regimes according to the behavior of three classiﬁcation variables: changes in the nominal exchange
rate, the volatility of these changes, and the volatility of international reserves. Since originally this index
is a measure of rigidity, exchange rate regimes are reordered from the more rigid to the more ﬂexible:
{1, 2, 3, 4} = {ﬁx, crawling peg, dirty ﬂoat, ﬂoat}. This index is averaged over ﬁve years.
4.1.3 Channels of exchange rate ﬂexibility
First, according to the model, the negative eﬀects of exchange rate ﬂexibility in dollarized countries is
originated in the variations of the real exchange rate. We therefore use a measure of the volatility of the
real exchange rate in order to test this prediction. We compute this volatility as the standard deviation
of annual changes in the logarithm of the World Bank index of real eﬀective exchange rate (REER). In
line with the model, this variable is positively correlated with the LS ﬂexibility measure (see Appendix
C).
Second, in the model, we assumed the law of one price. The variations in the REER are therefore
driven exclusively by the price of nontradable goods relative to tradables. However, violations of the law
13
of one price and more generally variation in the terms-of-trade also aﬀect the volatility of the REER in
the data. We therefore introduce the standard deviation of annual changes in the terms-of-trade index
provided by the World Bank in order to control whether the impact of exchange rate ﬂexibility comes
from terms-of-trade volatility or from the relative price of tradables. Besides, this variable could be an
important determinant of growth, as shown by Mendoza (1997).
4.1.4 The dollarization variable
The most important and most problematic variable is the liability dollarization measure. It is diﬃcult to
ﬁnd a measure which is both accurate and encompassing. Hausmann et al. (2001) and Hausmann and
Panizza (2003) provide data that can be used to construct a proxy for liability dollarization for a sample
of industrial and developing countries. They provide measures of original sin, that is the inability of an
economy to borrow internationally in its own currency. Their dataset covers 90 industrial and developing
countries. They rely on BIS data of the currency breakdown of foreign banks' assets and liabilities and
construct three indicators of original sin.
Those measures are restricted de facto to external dollarization and have a small time coverage, but
they encompass industrial countries and thus allow a substantial variability in the dollarization index.
Their advantage is that they give a good picture of the currency composition of the world's banking
sector's assets in the economy -especially for debt securities- and of the ability of countries to hedge
currency risk through swaps. The original sin measures are provided as averages for 1993-1998 and 1999-
2001, which allows to use only two 5-year sequences, 1995-1999 and 2000-2004. The dollarization index
used in this chapter is computed as the average of the three indicators. This index, called OSIN , ranges
from 0 to 1.
Figure 3 presents the distribution of original sin in industrial and developing countries. It appears
that it is concentrated on its maximum value in developing countries, while in industrial countries it is
lower on average and shows more variability. Besides, it is noteworthy that the original sin index varies
only in 20% of the countries between 1993-1998 and 1999-2001. Those characteristics of the dollarization
variable, that is high persistence and concentration on high values in developing countries, have to be
born in mind when choosing the methodology and running the robustness checks.
4.1.5 Other control variables
The set of control variables follows Levine et al. (2000) and Aghion et al. (2009): ﬁnancial development
measured as in Beck et al. (1999) by the amount of credit provided by banks and other ﬁnancial insti-
tutions to the private sector (as a share of GDP), education measured as the average years of secondary
schooling (Barro and Lee, 2000), inﬂation and the size of government measured by governement con-
sumption as a percentage of GDP and trade openness measured by the share of exports and imports in
GDP (World Bank).
Finally, the usable dataset covers 76 countries and two periods: 1995-1999 and 2000-2004. Appendix
B gives the exhaustive list of countries present in both samples and Appendix C provides some descriptive
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statistics.
4.1.6 Methodology
The benchmark speciﬁcation follows Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995), and more speciﬁcally Aghion et al.
(2009). But, instead of interacting exchange rate ﬂexibility and ﬁnancial development as Aghion et al.
(2009) do, I interact exchange rate ﬂexibility and dollarization. The estimated equation is the following:
∆yit = y
i
t − yit−1 = (α− 1)yit−1 + γ1Flexit + γ2OSIN it + γ3Flexit ∗OSIN it + dt + it (16)
where yit is the logarithm of real output per worker in country i at the end of period t, t = 1995 −
1999, 2000 − 2004, Flexit is the exchange rate ﬂexibility measure, OSIN it is the measure of original sin,
dt is a time eﬀect and 
i
t is the error term.
γ1 + γ3OSIN
i
t describes the overall eﬀect of exchange rate ﬂexibility on growth. γ1 (the linear term)
and γ1 + γ3 (which is provided as complementary information) can be interpreted respectively as the
eﬀect of exchange rate ﬂexibility in low dollarization countries (original sin=0) and in high dollarization
countries (original sin=1). The threshold original sin for which the sign of the overall impact of exchange
rate ﬂexibility changes is −γ1γ3 . The estimate for
−γ1
γ3
is provided along with its signiﬁcance test as
complementary information in the regressions. Besides, a Wald test for the signiﬁcance of exchange rate
total eﬀect is run.
The main hypothesis to test is whether exchange rate ﬂexibility has a more negative eﬀect on growth
when the level of dollarization increases. This would be validated by the data if γ3 is found signiﬁcantly
negative. Otherwise, the model would be rejected. The second hypothesis is that the threshold original
sin −γ1γ3 is between 0 and 1. This would mean that the impact of exchange rate risk on growth switches
from positive to negative within the actual range of the original sin measure. The validation of this
hypothesis would shed some light on the exchange rate instability puzzle, which could then be explained
by the presence of this kind of non-linearities.
Since the model is dynamic, country eﬀects are necessarily correlated with yit−1. The GMM dynamic
panel data estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) is imple-
mented. The persistence of the dollarization data justiﬁes the use of the extended system-GMM estimator
elaborated by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell and Bond (2000). Robust two-step standard errors
are also computed by following the method of Windmeijer (2004). Using this approach, the issue of the
endogeneity of the lagged explained variable is addressed. The set of instruments is selected according to
the following assumption: all the explanatory variables except initial income are predetermined and they
are uncorrelated with ﬁxed eﬀects.11 This assumption has been chosen after excluding more restrictive
11In practice, (16) is diﬀerentiated and the second lag of the endogenous variable yit−2 is used as an instrument for ∆y
i
t−1,
as well as further lags. Though our sample has only two available observations because of the scarcity of dollarization data,
we can rely on lags of yit beyond the limits of our data. To limit the number of instruments, I use only y
i
t−2 and y
i
t−3
to instrument ∆yit−1. Since we assume that the other regressors are predetermined, we use their ﬁrst and second lags as
instruments. The system-GMM method consists in adding equations (16) in level as additional observations to limit the
problem of weak instruments in presence of persistence. yit−1 is then instrumented with ∆y
i
t−1 and the other regressors in
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ones which suﬀered from weak instruments issues according to the Anderson and Cragg-Donald tests of
underidentiﬁcation.12 These tests assess whether the instruments give suﬃcient information to identify
the eﬀect of the variables of interest. The tables report the Hansen test in order to check whether the
set of instruments is globally valid.
4.2 The role of ﬁnancial dollarization
Table 1 shows the results of the GMM regression of productivity growth on the set of explanatory variables
described earlier, using equation (16).
Consider the impact of exchange rate ﬂexibility and original sin on growth. Regression (1) of Table
1 shows that in our sample, the overall impact of exchange rate ﬂexibility on growth is negative. But,
importantly, as column (2) shows, liability dollarization makes the impact of real exchange rate volatility
on growth more negative, as conjectured. This is illustrated by the fact that the coeﬃcient of the
interaction term of original sin and exchange rate ﬂexibility is signiﬁcantly negative (at the 5% level).
As conjectured, the threshold level of liability dollarization above which exchange rate ﬂexibility
becomes detrimental to growth is between 0 and 1 (0.56). As a consequence, on the one hand, the impact
of exchange rate ﬂexibility is signiﬁcantly negative in both speciﬁcations when original sin is equal to 1.
On the other hand, exchange rate ﬂexibility has a positive impact on growth in low dollarization countries
(the coeﬃcient of the linear term is positive), and this impact is signiﬁcant. Besides, the total eﬀect of
exchange rate ﬂexibility is signiﬁcant.
Notice that the linear eﬀect of original sin is signiﬁcantly positive, which is at odds with the ﬁndings
of Eichengreen et al. (2005) and Levy-Yeyati (2006), who show that the impact of liability dollarization
is either negative or unconclusive. However, the negative eﬀect of the linear term does not imply that the
overall eﬀect of original sin is positive. When evaluated with the average value of exchange rate ﬂexibility,
the impact of original sin is less signiﬁcant.
To illustrate the magnitude of these eﬀects, consider Poland: between the end of the nineties and the
beginning of the 2000s, its index of original sin moved from 0.92 to 0.62. Considering its LS index (4)
during 2000-2004, its growth gain is 0.5 percentage point per year, according to column. Similarly, an
entirely dollarized emerging country (original sin index equal to 1) with similar exchange rate ﬂexibility
would gain 1 percentage point of annual growth if it equalized its level of dollarization to that of Poland.
The regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) examine the channels of the impact of exchange rate
ﬂexibility on growth. Column (3) introduces REER volatility and its interaction with original sin. The
interaction of original sin with REER volatility is signiﬁcantly negative while its interaction with the LS
index of exchange rate ﬂexibility becomes non-signiﬁcant. This means that, as implied by the model, real
exchange rate volatility is the main channel through which exchange rate management aﬀects growth.
levels.
12This assumption has also been chosen for practical reasons. Because of data scarcity, it is impossible to use second
order lags of original sin. It can be therefore considered at best as predetermined (the other variables, in particular the
lagged explained variable, can still be instrumented thanks to the available higher lags).
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Column (4) estimates the impact of REER volatility along with terms-of-trade volatility and their
respective interactions with original sin. Neither terms-of-trade volatility nor its interaction with original
sin aﬀect growth, whereas the coeﬃcient of the interaction of REER volatility with original sin remains
signiﬁcantly negative. This suggests that the main channel through which REER volatility aﬀects growth
is the volatility of the relative price of nontradables.
Aghion et al. (2009) show that ﬁnancial development makes exchange rate volatility more harmful
to growth, as Appendix C shows. However, dollarization is strongly negatively correlated with ﬁnancial
development. In column (5), we test whether original sin is an independent determinant of the relationship
between exchange rate volatility and growth. This regression includes the interaction between ﬁnancial
development and exchange rate ﬂexibility. The interaction between exchange rate ﬂexibility and original
sin remains signiﬁcant, which suggests that original sin conditions the impact of exchange rate ﬂexibility
on growth independently from ﬁnancial development. The interaction between ﬁnancial development
and exchange rate ﬂexibility is non-signiﬁcant. However, given the strong correlation between original
sin and ﬁnancial development, this does not necessarily indicate that ﬁnancial development is irrelevant
in shaping the relationship between exchange rate regimes and growth.
4.3 Robustness checks
Columns (1)-(5) of Table 2 provide robustness checks. These robustness checks include adding traditional
controls in the growth regression, controlling for crisis episodes, using an alternative measure of original
sin and controlling for the heterogeneity between industrial and developing countries. The same method
of two-stage system-GMM and Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust standard errors is used.
4.3.1 Additional controls
As column (1) of Table 2 shows, the inclusion of additional controls does not change the results: the
interaction term between original sin and exchange rate ﬂexibility is still signiﬁcantly negative at the
5% level. Among the new variables, inﬂation and education show up as signiﬁcant. The lack of price
stability has a negative inﬂuence on growth while education has a positive impact, which in line with the
traditional ﬁndings of the literature and with common wisdom.
4.3.2 Currency crisis
Column (2) presents further robustness checks. The question tackled here is the role of currency crises.
Since episodes of crisis-driven devaluations occur mainly during ﬁxed exchange rate regimes and could be
mistakenly classiﬁed as ﬂexible exchange rate regimes, this question is important to assess the diﬀerent
advantages of ﬁxed exchange rate regimes versus ﬂoats.
A dummy for the occurrence of currency crisis episodes and its interaction with original sin are
introduced in the regression to check whether the negative growth eﬀect of the interaction between
original sin and exchange rate volatility is limited to episodes of ﬁnancial turmoil. We identify currency
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crisis through the freely falling episodes provided by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004). The results show that,
in spite of the inclusion of a dummy for freely falling episodes and its interaction with original sin, the
interaction of exchange rate ﬂexibility and original sin is still signiﬁcant. This shows that the particularly
negative impact of ﬂexible exchange rate regimes in dollarized countries highlighted before is not driven
by ﬁnancial turmoil episodes.
4.3.3 Dollarized indebtment
The original sin measure used in the baseline regressions is a composite index summarizing the inability
of a country to hedge currency risk. But it does not take into account the extent to which it is exposed
to this currency risk, that is debt liabilities. The amount of indebtment should qualify the importance of
original sin. We therefore construct another variable incorporating both original sin and debt liabilities,
and deﬁned as: OSIN2 = OSIN ∗DEBTL, where DEBTL refers to external debt liabilities over GDP
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2006). Column (3) provides the regression with this alternative original sin
measure. The results are reinforced: the coeﬃcient is now signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
4.3.4 Developing versus Industrial countries
Columns (4) to (6) try to determine whether our results are due to the fact that original sin is very high
in developing countries and low in industrial economies in general. The results could reﬂect only the
fact that exchange rate ﬂexibility is bad for growth in emerging economies as other authors have already
shown, without proving necessarily the role of dollarization. This objection is justiﬁed by the observation
that original sin is very correlated with the fact of being a developing or industrial country (see Figure 3
and the correlation between initial productivity and original sin in Appendix C).
A dummy for industrial countries and its interaction with exchange rate ﬂexibility are thus added in
columns (4) and (5), with our alternative measures of original sin. Consider column (4), which uses OSIN
as a measure of dollarization. The results are robust: the coeﬃcient is stable and remains signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. However, original sin being very stable in the sample of developing countries, the eﬀect of
the interaction term is identiﬁed mainly through the variation between industrial countries. To overcome
this problem, the second measure of original sin (OSIN2), incorporating debt liabilities and which thus
provides more variability among developing countries, is used in column (5). The interaction term remains
stable and signiﬁcant.
Finally, column (6) excludes industrial countries from the sample. The sample size being signiﬁcantly
reduced, the less signiﬁcant control variables (namely trade openness and government burden) are ex-
cluded. Since OSIN shows little variability in developing countries, OSIN2 is used as a measure of
dollarization in this regression. Here again, the interaction term is robustly negative.
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4.4 Endogeneity issues
One important reproach that can be addressed to our results is the question of endogeneity. Two diﬀerent
strategies are adopted to deal with this problem: 1) exogeneity tests are conducted within the GMM
methodology, 2) the endogeneity issue is dealt with by examining the existing empirical evidence on the
determinants of original sin and exchange rate ﬂexibility. This last discussion enables us to (i) address
the the simultaneity issue by introducing additional variables that could be correlated with both growth
and dollarization; and (ii) to propose an external instrumental variable for original sin.
First, note that the system-GMM methodology deals with the endogeneity of the lagged explanatory
variable. Still, the procedure is valid only under our assumption that the other regressors are predeter-
mined, which means that the regressors are uncorrelated with the current and future realizations of the
error term, and uncorrelated with ﬁxed eﬀects. This condition can be tested by a Sargan test of overiden-
tiﬁcation which assesses the overall validity of the instruments. All the Sargan tests of the tables accept
the validity of the set of instruments. Besides, as highlighted by Aghion et al. (2009), the interaction term
is less vulnerable to potential endogeneity issues than the corresponding linear terms, because it iden-
tiﬁes contrasting growth eﬀects. Indeed, the use of interactions is similar to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
method. Even though the linear eﬀect of original sin of exchange rate ﬂexibility might be biased, the
eﬀect of exchange rate ﬂexibility, given the level of original sin, can still be accurate.
Second, the literature has looked for the causes of original sin: Hausmann and Panizza (2003) ﬁnd
weak support for the idea that the level of development, institutional quality, monetary credibility or ﬁscal
solvency is correlated with original sin. Only the absolute size of the economy is robustly correlated. Other
studies analysed the determinants of other variables that could be partly related to original sin. Mehl
and Reynaud (2005) show that inﬂation - which is already included in the present growth regressions
- debt service to GDP, the slope of the yield curve and the investor base inﬂuence domestic original
sin. Levy-Yeyati (2006) ﬁnds that institutional variables and inﬂation, but also pass-through and the
procyclicality of the real exchange rate, have an impact on domestic dollarization. To study the impact
of dollarization on growth, he uses restrictions on onshore foreign currency deposits (De Nicolo et al.,
2003) as an instrument. The degree of pass-through and the correlation of the real exchange rate with
growth are not suﬃciently correlated with our index to be used as instruments in our study. However,
restrictions on foreign currency deposits appears as a good instrument for external original sin, so we use
them as an external instrument inside the GMM methodology. Concerning debt and institutions, since
they could also have an impact on growth, I include them in the regressions to check for robustness.
As for exchange rate ﬂexibility, some determinants have been highlighted in the literature. Hau
(2002) show that trade openness is an important factor in explaining real exchange rate volatility. This
variable is already included in our regressions in the robustness checks. Hausmann et al. (2006) ﬁnd that
growth has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on real exchange rate volatility. This should bias the eﬀect of
exchange rate volatility upwards. Therefore, if the coeﬃcient is negative despite this positive bias, our
interpretations remain correct.13
13For further discussion of the endogeneity issues associated with exchange rate ﬂexibility, see Aghion et al. (2009).
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Consider Table 3. Column (1) deals with the simultaneity issue by introducing the average of Kauf-
mann et al. (1999) Governance indicators, which should account for institutional quality and net external
debt as a share of GDP (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2006). The inﬂation rate is also maintained, since it
has also been pointed to as a cause for liability dollarization. The interaction between original sin and
exchange rate ﬂexibility is still negative and the main results are unchanged. The interaction term loses
accuracy, but remains statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The signs of the additional variables are
sensible: institutional quality favors growth while net debt is damaging.
Column (2) uses restrictions on foreign currency deposits from De Nicolo et al. (2003) and its inter-
action with exchange rate ﬂexibility to instrument original sin and its interaction. The negative eﬀect of
the interaction still appears as robust.14
As a conclusion, the nonlinear eﬀect of exchange rate ﬂexibility and original sin on growth is globally
robust to the inclusion of additional controls and to the use of an alternative measure of original sin:
exchange rate ﬂexibility has a more negative impact on productivity growth in dollarized than in non-
dollarized countries. Besides, this additional negative eﬀect is not due to exchange rate crisis episodes.
Additionally, the high concentration of original sin in developing country is not driving our results.
Finally, the results are robust to endogeneity treatments.
5 Conclusion
This paper discusses the conventional view that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the growth perfor-
mances of ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rate regimes. This view has been misleadingly vehicled by the
empirical literature because usually the speciﬁcity of emerging markets ﬁnancial systems is not taken
into account. Whereas Aghion et al. (2009) highlight the role of ﬁnancial development, this paper fo-
cuses on original sin, which is another prominent feature of the developing world. A theoretical model
is developed, in which the higher the share of foreign currency in external debt, the more exchange rate
volatility is detrimental to growth, which is in line with the empirical results of section 4: the interaction
of exchange rate ﬂexibility with original sin has a negative impact. It appears also that, in absolute
terms, exchange rate ﬂexibility is growth-reducing in highly dollarized countries and growth-enhancing
in low dollarization countries. Consistently, the threshold original sin above which exchange rate risk
becomes detrimental to growth is estimated to be signiﬁcantly between zero and one. This sheds some
light on the instability of the eﬀect of exchange rate volatility on growth in previous literature. We also
show that these predictions survive robustness checks and endogeneity treatment.
The study of the impact of exchange rate ﬂexibility on growth can help address the issue of the
choice of monetary framework in a setting of ﬁnancial openness and growing cross-country capital ﬂows.
The available choices are delimited by the trilemma (Obstfeld et al., 2005): under capital mobility,
policymakers cannot attain simultaneously exchange rate stability and domestically-oriented monetary
14Interestingly, when adding additional variables and controlling for endogeneity, the linear term becomes unsigniﬁcant,
which does not contradict previous evidence in the literature.
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policy. Typically, adopting an exchange rate peg entails the sacriﬁce of the shock absorption capacity of
exchange rate ﬂexibility when nominal prices and wages are sticky. This is indeed the case in this paper's
theoretical framework. However, liability dollarization makes it more diﬃcult for the emerging countries
that embrace ﬁnancial globalization to adopt ﬂoating exchange rates and explains why they exhibit fear
of ﬂoating (Hausmann et al., 2001; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). This study sheds some additional light
on the reasons why developing economies ﬁnd it hard to draw a comfortable resolution of the trilemma.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Proofs
The log-linearized, reduced-form model
Let xt denote the deviation from the non-stochastic steady state of Xt: xt =
Xt−X
X w ln(Xt)− ln(X).
We are interested in the behavior of pi (time subscripts are dropped for simplicity). We thus log-
linearize (6) and use the labor demand (5) to infer:
pi = (1− κ)(η + 1)yT + κ(pN − pT + yN )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gross proﬁt eﬀect
+ (1− κ)η(1− α)pT︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt valuation eﬀect
where κ =
PN2
2PTW
1−(1+r∗)d+ PN2
2PTW
denotes the steady-state share of nontradables in the cash ﬂows and η =
(1+r∗)d
1−(1+r∗)d denotes the steady-state ratio of debt repayments over the tradable consumption (tradable
proﬁt minus debt repayments). We have 0 < κ < 1 and η > 0. The ﬁrst and second terms of pi represent
respectively the tradable and nontradable gross proﬁts valued in terms of tradables (or dollars). The
last term represents the eﬀect of the debt currency composition on the ﬁnancing capacities of ﬁrms.
For example, everything equal, a nominal exchange rate depreciation (appreciation), that is a rise in pT
(a fall) leads to a depreciation (appreciation) in the value of the nontradable gross proﬁts, but it also
alleviates (increases) the peso-denominated part of the debt when α < 1. If α = 1, debt repayments in
terms of tradables are immune to nominal exchange rate variations and cannot hedge the variations in
the tradable value of proﬁts. However, one needs to consider how yT , yN , pT and pN vary jointly. To
know how pi reacts to the productivity shock u, it is then suﬃcient to know the behavior of production
and prices, which we can derive from the following reduced-form model.
The log-linearization of the relative demand for tradables and nontradables (10) (pN−pT = 1θ (cT−cN ))
and the equilibrium conditions (14) (cN = yN ) and (15) (cT = (η + 1)yT + η(1− α)pT ) gives:
pN − pT = 1
θ
[(η + 1)yT + η(1− α)pT − yN ] (17)
The relative price of nontradables in terms of tradables has to fall either if the production of nontradables
rises or if the production of tradables falls. This also happens if α < 1 and the nominal exchange rate
appreciates (pT falls), because this makes the peso-denominated debt increase which leaves less tradable
goods to consume for the household.
Besides, the log-linearization of supply of nontradables (4) (yN = l2 ) and the labor demand (5)
(pN + yN = l) yields:
yN = pN (18)
Here we see that a deﬂation in pN has a contractionary eﬀect on yN . This is because nominal wages
are preset. As a consequence, a deﬂation in pN depresses the production of nontradables through the rise
of the real wage.
Moreover, by log-linearizing the supply for tradables (3), we obtain:
yT = u (19)
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Finally, the two possible policy choices are the following:
• Flexible exchange rate:
p = 0
Besides, according to (11) (p = γpT + (1− γ)pN ) the ﬂexible rule reduces to:
pT =
−(1− γ)
γ
pN (20)
• Fixed exchange rate:
pT = 0 (21)
With only (17), (18), (19) and one of the two monetary rules (20) or (21), pi can be inferred.
Reactions of quantities and prices to shocks
The reduced form model composed of (17), (18), (19) and one of the two monetary rules (20) or (21) is
solved to obtain the following Lemma:
Lemma 1
• Under a ﬂexible exchange rate,
pNflex =
γ(η + 1)u
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α) , p
Tflex =
(1− γ)(η + 1)u
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α)
pNflex − pTflex = (η + 1)u
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α)
yNflex =
γ(η + 1)u
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α) , y
Tflex = u
• Under a ﬁxed exchange rate,
pNfix =
(η + 1)u
θ + 1
, pTfix = 0, pNfix − pTfix = (η + 1)u
θ + 1
yNfix =
(η + 1)u
θ + 1
, yTfix = u
Lemma 1 is used to establish Proposition 1:
Proof of Proposition 1
• From Lemma 1, if u < 0:
yNflex > yNfix ⇔ γ(θ + 1) < θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α)⇔ (1− γ)[θ + η(1− α)] > 0: always true.
pNflex − pTflex < pNfix − pTfix ⇔ θ + 1 > θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α)⇔ α > 1− 1η , true for α = 1.
• From Lemma 1, yNflex and pNflex − pTflex are both decreasing in (1− α).
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Proof of Proposition 2
• From Lemma 1, we derive:
yNflex + pNflex − pTflex = κ(1 + γ)(η + 1)u
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α) < y
Nfix + pNfix − pTfix = 2κ(η + 1)u
θ + 1
if u < 0:
⇔ (κ(1 + γ)(η + 1)
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α) >
2κ(η + 1)
θ + 1
⇔ κ(1 + γ)(θ + 1) > 2κ[θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α)]
after rearranging:
⇔ α > 1− κ(1− θ)
η
is true for α = 1 since θ < 1
• yNflex + pNflex − pTflex is decreasing in (1− α).
Proof of Proposition 3
From Lemma 1, we derive:
piflex(u) =
[θ + γ + κ(1− θ)](η + 1)
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α) u
pifix(u) =
[θ + 1 + κ(1− θ)](η + 1)
θ + 1
u
Πi = E(Π) + pii, i = {flex, fix}, so Πflex and Πfix are of the same form as (2), with the following
resulting aggregate shocks:
σpiflex =
[θ + γ + κ(1− θ)](η + 1)
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α) σ
σpifix =
[θ + 1 + κ(1− θ)](η + 1)
θ + 1
σ
• According to section 2.2.3, a ﬁxed exchange rate yields higher growth than a ﬂexible one (that is,
E(ρfix) > E(ρflex)), if and only if σpiflex > σpifix.
σpiflex > σpifix ⇔ [θ + γ + κ(1− θ)](θ + 1) > [θ + 1 + κ(1− θ)][θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α)]
⇔ α > 1− κ(1−θ)η[1+κ+(1−κ)θ] : true for α = 1 since θ < 1.
• σpiflex − σpifix is a measure of the growth diﬀerential between the ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rate
regimes.
We have ∂(σ
piflex−σpifix)
∂α =
∂σpiflex
∂α > 0, which means that the growth diﬀerential decreases when α
diminishes.
• σpifix > σpiflex ⇔ α > 1− κ(1−θ)η[1+κ+(1−κ)θ] and 1− κ(1−θ)η[1+κ+(1−κ)θ] > 0⇔ κ(1−θ)η[1+κ+(1−κ)θ] < 1
This means that if the indebtment level η and the elasticity of substitution θ are high and if the
share of nontradable production κ is low, then there exist a level of dollarization α > 0 under which
a peg is more growth-enhancing than a ﬂoat.
24
Appendix B: Countries in sample
Asia Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa
China Argentina Kenya (only 95-99)
Hong Kong, China Bolivia (only 95-99) Mauritius
India Brazil South Africa
Indonesia Chile Zimbabwe (only 95-99)
Korea, Rep. Colombia Industrial countries
Malaysia Costa Rica Australia
Pakistan Dominican Republic Austria (only 00-04)
Philippines Ecuador Belgium (only 00-04)
Singapore El Salvador Canada
Sri Lanka Guatemala Denmark
Thailand Jamaica Finland
Transition countries Mexico France (only 00-04)
Bulgaria Nicaragua Germany
Czech Republic Panama (only 95-99) Greece
Cyprus Papua New Guinea (only 95-99) Ireland
Estonia Peru Italy
Hungary (only 00-04) Trinidad and Tobago 00-04 Japan
Kazakhstan (only 00-04) Uruguay Netherlands (only 00-04)
Latvia Venezuela, RB (only 95-99) New Zealand
Lithuania Middle East and North Africa Norway
Moldova (only 95-99) Algeria (only 95-99) Portugal
Poland Bahrain (only 95-99) Spain
Romania (only 00-04) Egypt, Arab Rep. (only 00-04) Sweden
Slovak Republic Israel Switzerland
Slovenia Oman (only 95-99) United Kingdom
Turkey Tunisia United States
Ukraine 95-99
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Appendix C: Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics 1995-2004 (data in ﬁve-year averages)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Productivity growth 134 0,02 0,02 -0,05 0,10
Initial productivity 134 26413,24 18668,75 2172,53 70091,68
Financial development 134 0,53 0,39 0,03 1,63
Education 134 83,79 28,43 14,00 158,76
Trade openness 134 81,38 46,03 18,11 322,35
Inﬂation 134 0,08 0,11 -0,02 0,78
Government burden 134 15,87 5,17 5,52 29,21
Kaufman governance index 134 3,19 4,83 -7,06 11,69
Net external debt 134 0,24 0,42 -2,15 1,88
REER vol. 90 0,06 0,04 0,01 0,19
LS Index of ER ﬂex. 129 2,40 1,18 1,00 4,00
Original sin 134 0,86 0,22 0,20 1,00
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Table 1: Growth eﬀect of the ﬂexibility of Exchange Rate Regime and its channels - 2-step system-GMM
estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial output per worker -0.006 0.005 -0.002 0.000435 0.00327
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.00733) (0.00556)
Financial development 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.00466 0.00246
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.00740) (0.00888)
Original sin 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.0364* 0.0511***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.0207) (0.0181)
LS Flexibility Index -0.006*** 0.009** 0.005* 0.00793**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.00368)
LS Flexibility*Original sin -0.016** -0.008 -0.0139**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.00674)
Real eﬀective exchange rate volatility 0.234 0.400*
(0.181) (0.215)
REER volatility*Original sin -0.516** -0.617**
(0.206) (0.259)
Terms of trade volatility -0.516
(0.553)
TT volatility*Original sin 0.465
(0.569)
LS Flexibility*Financial development 0.000704
(0.00272)
Eﬀect of LS ﬂex. when O.sin=1 -0.007** -0.004 -0.006012
(0.003) 0.003 0.0038568
Wald test (F-statistic): 3.42** 1.49 2.37*
H0: LS ﬂex. total eﬀect = 0
Threshold Original sin 0.56 0.63 0.57
H0: Threshold = 0 (F-statistic) 40.86*** 16.20*** 19.89***
H0: Threshold = 1 (F-statistic) 23.39*** 9.01*** 11.43***
Hansen overidentiﬁcation test
H0 Valid instruments (Prob > chi2) 0.064 0.123 0.524 0.892 0.199
Observations 132 132 88 72 132
Number of countries 76 76 51 40 76
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
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Table 2: Growth eﬀects of the ﬂexibility of Exchange Rate Regime - Robustness checks - 2-step system-
GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excluding
industrial
Initial output per worker -0.015** -0.00713 -0.012* -0.0130 -0.013* -0.015*
(0.007) (0.00699) (0.007) (0.00894) (0.008) (0.008)
Financial development -0.001 -0.00318 -0.002 -0.00183 -0.001 0.004
(0.008) (0.00504) (0.004) (0.00855) (0.004) (0.004)
Original sin 0.028 0.0383** 0.0353
(0.022) (0.0158) (0.0256)
Original Sin 2 0.010* 0.009 0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
LS Flexibility Index 0.005* 0.00676** 0.002 0.00815 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.00285) (0.002) (0.00665) (0.003) (0.004)
LS Flexibility*Original sin -0.011** -0.0132*** -0.0141**
(0.005) (0.00429) (0.00693)
LS Flexibility*Original sin 2 -0.014*** -0.013** -0.019***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Control variables
Education 0.034*** 0.0261** 0.038*** 0.0344*** 0.038*** 0.037***
(0.010) (0.00988) (0.008) (0.0109) (0.007) (0.010)
Trade openness 0.005 0.00748 0.010** 0.00536 0.008
(0.007) (0.00542) (0.004) (0.00780) (0.005)
Inﬂation -0.066*** -0.0625** -0.062** -0.0678*** -0.063** -0.047**
(0.022) (0.0293) (0.027) (0.0202) (0.029) (0.022)
Government burden -0.006 -0.00413 -0.010* -0.00628 -0.008
(0.007) (0.00743) (0.005) (0.00737) (0.005)
Freely falling -0.255
(0.189)
Freely falling* Original sin 0.252
(0.191)
Industrial country 0.00201 -0.009
(0.0176) (0.009)
Industrial country*LS Flexibility -0.00155 0.003
(0.00415) (0.003)
Institutional quality
Net external debt
Hansen overidentiﬁcation test
H0 Valid instruments (Prob > chi2) 0.597 0.992 0.606 0.552 0.566 0.525
Observations 129 125 129 129 129 92
Number of countries 75 71 75 75 75 54
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
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Table 3: Growth eﬀects of the ﬂexibility of Exchange Rate Regime - Endogeneity treatment - 2-step
system-GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time eﬀects
(1) (2)a
Initial output per worker -0.0221*** -0.00619
(0.00734) (0.00797)
Financial development -0.00295 -0.000736
(0.00586) (0.00655)
Original sin 0.00434 0.0106
(0.00364) (0.00758)
LS Flexibility Index 0.0413** 0.0661**
(0.0203) (0.0285)
LS Flexibility*Original sin -0.0100* -0.0181**
(0.00531) (0.00827)
Control variables
Education 0.0272*** 0.0281*
(0.00865) (0.0154)
Trade openness -0.000225 0.00667
(0.00519) (0.00631)
Inﬂation -0.0536** -0.0571***
(0.0265) (0.0193)
Government burden -0.00626 -0.000733
(0.00706) (0.00809)
Institutional quality 0.00262**
(0.00126)
Net external debt -0.01000**
(0.00495)
Hansen overidentiﬁcation test
H0 Valid instruments (Prob > chi2) 0.849 0.998
Observations 129 91
Number of countries 75 51
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
a: Restrictions on onshore foreign currency deposits (De Nicolo et al., 2003) used as external instrument.
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Figure 1: The eﬀect of a negative shock in the tradable sector (u = −1)
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Assumptions: θ = 0.6, γ = 0.4, κ = 0.6, η = 0.7. η denotes the steady-state ratio of debt repayments over the tradable
consumption (tradable proﬁt minus debt repayments) and κ is the steady-state share of nontradables in cash ﬂows.
35
Figure 2: The variance of ﬁrms' cash ﬂows
V(π)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
α
Flexible (η=0.7)
Fixed (η=0.7)
Flexible (η=0.1)
Fixed (η=0.1)
Assumptions: θ = 0.6, γ = 0.4, κ = 0.6. η denotes the steady-state ratio of debt repayments over the tradable
consumption (tradable proﬁt minus debt repayments) and κ is the steady-state share of nontradables in cash ﬂows.
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Figure 3: Distribution of original sin in industrial and developing countries
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Source: Hausmann et al. (2001).
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